Across three days this month, there were two major events providing meaningful insight into how the European—and potentially the global—space industry is likely to develop in the coming years. On 8 September 2026, the UK Government published its new Space Strategy (the “Strategy”), setting out the UK’s vision to be a competitive space power, backed by GBP 7.8m in funding through to 2030. Over the next two days, on 9-10 September, political leaders, agency chiefs, and industry executives from ninety countries attended the International Space Summit (the “Summit”), to debate key space policy issues, including orbital debris and European launch sovereignty.

The Strategy understandably sets out more detailed policies for the space sector in the UK than the discussions at the Summit, but we expect to see further detail from the EU in due course, particularly as the legislative process around the European Commission’s proposal for a Space Act (which we describe in more detail here) continue. In any event, however, the Strategy and French President Emmanuel Macron’s closing statement at the Summit share key themes. In particular, they both focus on government investment as a driver of the private space industry and the need for a high degree of “sovereignty” for certain space-based activities, i.e., a high degree of domestic control arising from secure space infrastructure and services, and domestic capacity to provide that infrastructure and those services. For more details about the EU’s broader push towards tech sovereignty by advancing these principles, see our prior post here.

Below, we summarize the main points arising from the Strategy and the Summit in more detail, consider further the areas of overlap and divergence, and set out potential next steps for organizations developing and utilizing space services.

1. The UK Space Strategy

The Strategy established seven space domains that the UK is focused on: satellite communications (“SatCom”), space-domain awareness (“SDA”), in-orbit servicing, assembly and manufacturing (“ISAM”), assured access to space, positioning, navigation and timing (“PNT”), Earth observation (“EO”), and space discovery. Of these, the Strategy designates SatCom, SDA, ISAM, and access to space “accelerated” priorities. This means these four subsectors will be prioritized in terms of investment. PNT, EO, and discovery remain funded but receive less strategic emphasis.

The UK Government proposes to drive progress in each area through a combination of procurement and funding mechanisms, new regulatory frameworks, and non-binding policy directives. In particular, the new “Enterprise Space Category” (“ESC”) will standardize procurement routes in the space sector and will potentially act as an anchor client for certain companies—shifting away from providing low-level grant funding to focusing on ensuring commercial scale for companies offering capabilities deemed strategically important. The ESC will also signal defense demand for space services and publish a pipeline of forthcoming contract opportunities across government.

Turning to each of the “accelerated priorities” in turn:

• For SatCom, the Strategy envisages a single, sovereign government architecture based on the existing SKYNET system that is interoperable with capacity from allies and commercial enterprises. The headline funding commitment is GBP 2.8 billion by 2030, with GBP 2.3bn allocated to defense satellite communications, GBP 80m for connectivity in LEO, and GBP 57m for rail connectivity.
• For SDA, the UK Government wishes to develop nationally separable sensors, data, and analysis capabilities, with a focus on high-fidelity location services tracking and space-based weather forecasting.
• For ISAM, the UK Government states that it is aiming to become an early leader in various in-space operations. This will involve providing funding for activities including debris removal and demonstrations of in-space capabilities. The Strategy also indicates that it will implement liability waivers for qualifying ISAM and lunar missions launched before the end of 2030.
• For access to space, the Strategy centers on developing its existing domestic launch capability from SaxaVord in the Shetland Islands (which focuses on missions requiring polar and sun-synchronous orbits). The UK acknowledges that it will need to supplement this capability with external partnerships for other types of missions. The Strategy also emphasizes the need for a streamlined regulatory framework. It states that the Civil Aviation Authority (“CAA”) will implement a “collect once, use many times” licensing approach from 2026, with options for multi-mission licenses available by early 2027. It further states that Ofcom will publish a framework for launch-spectrum authorizations by Autumn 2026, as well as guidance on ISAM, a sandbox for re-entry services, and potentially lighter-touch regimes for specific types of space services.

The Strategy also sets out forthcoming reforms aiming to reduce the costs of access to space, including variable operator-liability limits, new insurance models, and abolition of requiring satellite constellation operators to maintain decommissioning funds in favor of ongoing financial-health monitoring.

2. Outcomes of the International Space Summit

The program at the Summit spanned the global space economy, science and exploration, and security through diplomacy, defense, and partnerships, but key themes surfaced throughout.

• European sovereign access to space and space services. Macron described space as economic infrastructure, a scientific and climate asset, and a source of operational superiority. He called for European launch capacity at mass, affordable scale—not just one-off launches—and aggregated European institutional launch demand. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen echoed these themes, also expressing support for the forthcoming Space Act and greater private investment, while stressing that secure communications and critical capabilities should not depend wholly on non-European systems. Andrius Kubilius, the European Commissioner for Defense and Space, said launch is a strategic priority and projected that Commission launch demand under the next multiannual financial framework (“MFF”) would rise substantially.
• Industrial policy. A key theme was the role of government procurement in stimulating private investment. ESA Director General Josef Aschbacher argued that Europe must decide whether to shape future building and services on the moon and (eventually) on Mars or remain dependent on others. Specifically, the ESA announced a EUR 760m contract with The Exploration Company to demonstrate and build out mission capability, and Aschbacher explicitly described ESA as an anchor customer enabling innovation, private investment, and global competition. There may be further detail on this—particularly in the context of using space for defense capabilities—when the Commission publishes its long-awaited European Security Strategy. This is currently scheduled for publication at the end of October.
• Global cooperation. Despite claims to require sovereignty, key stakeholders acknowledged that space is—by definition—global, and that sovereign launch and space services infrastructure does not mean refusing to interact or cooperate with others. Instead, Macron in particular called for shared governance of debris, spectrum, and in-space traffic globally. Rwandan President Paul Kagame also argued developing countries should participate as technology producers and rule-shapers, not merely users. Notably, however, the Summit did not result in any binding declaration or governance framework that might update existing treaties regarding space. The Summit is therefore better seen as an early step towards potential future global frameworks, if any do ultimately materialize.

3. Key Overlaps and Differences

The Strategy and the themes of the Summit share their core propositions: that the private sector will do the bulk of the work in developing and delivering space-based services in the future; that the public sector can and should stimulate the growth of the private sector in space (including by Government acting as an anchor client for private companies); that European countries want and believe that they need sovereign launch capacity and sovereign control over at least some space-based services; and that international cooperation is necessary on many key issues, such as debris, spectrum management, environmental sustainability, and collision avoidance.

The differences, then, are more in the operational details. The focus of the Summit’s approach to sovereignty issues was around the EU’s “strategic autonomy,” i.e., the ability to pursue its own interests without heavy reliance on foreign states, while the Strategy is more focused developing the UK’s own space capabilities that are “nationally separable” from external parties, i.e., ensuring that the UK can maintain certain capabilities even if it can no longer work with certain partners. The Strategy similarly focuses on more manageable goals in the short-to-medium term, while certain discussions at the Summit focused on longer-term goals, including lunar base building and even Mars exploration. The finer details will therefore develop over time.

4. Next Steps

Looking ahead, companies operating in the space sector (and those purchasing services from such companies) should continue to monitor the development of several regulatory regimes relevant to their operations:

• UK regulatory reforms. Companies should prepare for the CAA’s multi-mission licensing, Ofcom launch-spectrum authorizations, and forthcoming sustainability guidance. Operators should also monitor liability eligibility and the detailed implementation of financial reforms—they should not treat each measure as automatically available before final instruments and guidance are published.
• UK procurement pipeline. Companies may wish to track the Enterprise Space Category (“ESC”) demand pipeline and departmental frameworks, particularly for SatCom and EO.
• EU Space Act and European preference. Companies are likely already aware of the debates surrounding the EU Space Act and the increasing emphasis on “European Preference” in EU public procurement. They should continue to monitor developments as the legislation moves through the legislative process.

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Covington’s Technology Regulatory, Aerospace and Defense, and Public Policy Practices will continue to monitor developments affecting the Space sector around the world. If you have any questions about the issues raised in the blog, please do not hesitate to contact us.